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In the United States, many industries have a Silicon Valley-type geographic localization.
In Europe, these same industries often have four or more major centers of production. This
difference is presumably the result of the formal and informal trade bathers that have divided the
European market. With the growing integration of that market, however, there is the possibility
that Europe will develop an American-style economic geography. This paper uses a theoretical
model of industrial localization to demonstrate this possibility, and to show the possible transition
costs associated with this shift.
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and NBER ENGLANDGeographers have long noted the importance of "induszr:a:
districts" in interregional specialization within the United
States. In many industries firms tend to cluster together, drawn by
the availability of a strong local base of specialized suppliers
(often including a pool of labor with specialized Skills) ; this
local base in turn owes its existence to the local concentration of
demand. Thus a circular process of agglomeration takes place.
Historical industrial districts include such famous examples as the
Detroit-centered automotive region and the New York garnent
industry; today the phenomenon is perhaps best represented by
California's Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128.
Unlike geographers, economists studying international trade
have traditionally paid little attention to the role of industry
agglomerations as a cause of specialization (with the notable
exception of Ohlin (1933), who used the jewelry concentration in
Solingen to illustrate the role of increasing returns). This
neglect may in part be viewed as a theoretical blind spot: before
1980 trade theorists were reluctant to address the role of
increasing returns in any form, and the post—1980 literature on
"intraindustry" trade initially tended to emphasize internal as
opposed to external economies of scale.The neglect of
agglomeration may also, however, have been a realistic judgement.
While industrial districts like the auto region have obviously
played a crucial role in interreional speciilization within the
United States (and within other countries as well), their role in
international trade is less apparent. To take the clearest example,
the European automotive industry never developed a single hub2
comparable to Detroit.
There is rio mystery about why agglomeration has beena more
potentforce for iriterregionalthanforinternational
specialization. Barriers to trade between national economies --
bothformal barriers such as tariffs and the de facto barriers
created by differences in language and culture, lack offactor
mobility, arid the sheer nuisance presented by the existence of a
border -—areoften enough to block the expansion of a successful
industrial district beyond its national market. Detroit's initial
advantage allowed it to crowd out its competitors in New York,
Connecticut, and Pennsylvania before World War I; no European
automotive center could do the same in the far less integrated
European auto market.
For this reason, industries within Europe are in general much
less geographically concentrated than their counterparts within the
United States. Table 1 offers some examples, exploiting the fact
that the four major US regions are roughly comparable in population
and income to the four large European economies. It is obvious that
in each case production is far more localized in the US.
Recently, however, the European Community has introduced
sweeping measures designed to create a truly unified continental
market. TheCommunitywas already a free trade area in the
conventional, sense, but now therewillalso be guaranteed freedom
of direct investment, labor mobility, harmonization of regulations,
and a complete elimination of border formalities. While Europe will
not be able to emulate the US in adopting a common language, in all3
other respects it will constitute a highly integrated and for the
most part geographically compact economy -—preciselythe
conditions under which one might expect many industries to serve
the market from a single local agglomeration rather than be shared
by three or four countries.
This prospect raises several questions. First, where will the
industrial districts of 21st century Europe be located? That is,
which country will get Europe's' Silicon Valley, its Wall Street,
and so on? Second, will the format3.on of such districts be
beneficial to the European economy? Finally, how will the
adjustment take place ——ifan industry that currently has several
national centers coalesces around a single European center, what
happens to the workers left behind?
This paper makes a first step toward answering these questions
by developing a stylized theoretical model of the relationship
between industrial agglomeration and international trade. The model
is closely related to recent work in economic geography, e.g.
Krugman (1991); unlike most of the recent geography papers,
however, it assumes that factors are immobile between countries.
Following Venabiss (1993), we find that vertical linkages among
industries can play a rol. in industrial specialization similar to
that played by factor mobility in more aggregate agglomeration
stories. In particular, we find that increased integration --a
reduction in the costs of doing business across space --somewhat
paradoxically makes it more likely that firms in the same industry
will cluster together.4
While this paper was inspired by the issues surrounding
European integration, we believe that the model is of broader
interest as well. It offers a somewhat novel perspective on the
forces driving international specialization and trade in general.
And we believe that this model, in which strongly nonlinear
dynamics emerge as a natural consequence of the economic analysis,
illustrates the likely importance of such dynamics in economic
modelling more broadly.
1. The model
Imagine a world in which there are several industries, in each
of which both goods intended for final consumption and intermediate
goods are produced subject to economies of scale. Imagine also that
there are several countries with similar resources and technology,
all of which are capable of producing both final and intermediate
goods in these industries. Suppose, however, that initially
transport costs between these countries are very high. Then it is
natural to suppose that each country will maintain the full range
of industries, producing both final goods and the intermediate
inputs into those final goods. There may be some intraindustry
trade in differentiated products, but there will be no process of
interindustry specialization.
But now suppose that transport costs fall to a lower level
(though not to zero). Then a country with a somewhat stronger
initial position in some industry than its competitors may find5
itself with an advantage that cumulates over time. Producers of
final goods will find that the country with the larger industry
supports a larger base of intermediate producers, which gives them
low enough costs to export to other markets; producers of
intermediate goods will find that it is to their advantage to
concentrate their production near the large final good industry.
Thus each industry will tend to concentrate in one of the
countries. The result, somewhat paradoxically, will be that greater
integration will lead countries to become more different --when
transport costs fall below some critical level, a dynamic process
of regional specialization and differentiation will take place.
This is a simple and intuitively plausible story, but it is
not that easy to formalize. Indeed, a formal model of this process
must contain what may at first seem a daunting number of features.
It must have an input-output structure with several classes of both
final and intermediate goods; it must involve increasing returns,
and therefore must somehow deal with the problem of imperfectly
competitive market structure; and it must introduce transport
costs, no easy matter when there are both an input-output structure
and imperfect competition. One might easily conclude that any
attempt at formal modeling would quickly lead to an unwieldy
structure and bog down in taxonomy.
To avoid this, we inevitably rely on a series of modeling
tricks. These include the now—familiar devices of the "new trade
theory", namely assuming special functional forms and symmetryat
several levels. But even this turns out not to be enough: at the6
final stage we are obliged to turn to numerical methods to explore
the model. Thus our results make no pretense of generality. They
are, however, highly suggestive.
We assume, then, a world in which there are two countries,
Home and Foreign. The countries are symmetric; we will write the
equations describing Home's tastes and technology, and simply note
that the same equations apply to Foreign.
The countries share common tastes for two groups of products,
1 and 2. The tastes of both countries can be represented by the
same utility function,
U a (1)
where C1, i1,2 is consumption of an aggregate of a large number of
differentiated products, taking the form
cJj._)1a/tt)
(2)
Each country has only a single factor of production, labor.
Production of any individual good does not, however, involve labor
alone: it also involves the use of intermediate inputs. We
represent this by defining a composite input Z1 used in each
industry, with
— L.-&hl4r (3)
Inthis setup, M is a measure of the importance of intermediate
goods.
But what is the intermediate good? It, like the consumption
aggregates in (1), is an aggregate of many diferentiated products.7
Andwe make the major strategic simplification of assuming that the
definition of the aggregate intermediate input is identical to that
of the aggregate consumption good in each industry:
ML am,0_b0J0
(4)
We also assume that production of any differentiated product
is subject to economies of scale. In the familiar way, we represent
this by assuming a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost --but
not in terms of labor, but in terms of the composite input Z:
— +1Q (5)
where the output Qq may be used either for consumption or as an
intermediate input.
Notice the trick here: we have in effect assumed that each
industry, which produces a variety of goods subject to economies of
scale at the level of the individual plant, uses its own output as
an input. This gives rise to external economies of scale,since a
larger industry provides itself with a larger variety of inputsand
thus lowers its own costs. (Venables (1993) considers the more
general case in which intermediate and final goods aredistinct.
The advantage of theformulationin this paper is that it leads to
a more natural formulation of the dynamics).
We will assume free entry into both industries inboth
countries. Given the existence of a large number of symmetric
potential products, not all of which are actually produced (because3
of the fixed costs) ,thisimplies a monopolistically competitive
economy in which firms exercise monopoly power but profits are
dissipated through entry. The assumptions made here imply, i
particular, a Dixit—Stiglitz (1977)—type economy in which each firm
sees itself as facing the constant elasticity of demand .
Tocomplete the model, we turn to trade and factor markets.
The two countries are assumed able to trade with each other, but
only at a cost. This cost is, in the manner now familiar from the
geography literature, assumed to take Samuelson's "iceberg" form:
in order to deliver one unit of any good from one country to the
other, t>l units must be shipped.
In the factor markets, we assume that labor is immobile
between the two countries, and choose units so that each country
has a labor force of 1. Labor is fully employed, and can be
employed in either industry. It does not, however, move
instantaneously. Instead, we impose an ad hoc rule under which
workers movegradually toward the industrythat offers the higher
wagerate.' Our qualitative results do not dependon the specific
rule assumed, but for the sake of concretness (and for numerical
examples) we impos. the specific functional f.rm
'Ideally, th. adjustment of the labor force would be derived
from a complete model in which workers faceexplicitcosts of
adjustment and take into account expected futurewagesrates as
well as the current wage differential. As shown in Kruqman (1991)
and Matsuyama (1991), however, forward—looking adjustment together
with external economies easily leads to severe problems of
indeterminacy, problems that would tend to obscure the rather
straightforward economic logic of this paper. Thus we choose to
limit ourselves to a simpl. adjustment rule.9
dL
=61n(w,/w2)L.L2 (6)
Thiscompletes the model. We turn next to the determination of
short-run and long—run equilibrium.
2. Solving the model
The dynamics of the model just presented can most usefully be
described as a trajectory in resource allocation space. At any
point in time each country has a certain amount of labor in
industry 1, the remainder in industry 2. Given L1 and L1, it is
possible to solve for the wage rates w1, w2, and so on; it is these
wage rates that in turn determine the evolution of the resource
allocation in each country, following the dynamic equation (6). So
our eventual objective is to be able to draw a map showing how the
economy evolves from any initial position in LL, L1 space; we will
see several such maps later. In order to do this, however, we must
be able to solve the static problem of determining wages given the
resource allocation.
In describing th. solution of this static problem, it is useful
to think in terms of a computational loop. Suppose you had initial
estimates of wage rates in each industry and in each country, as
well as estimates of the true price indices for each industry (a
concept we will define shortly). Then it would be possibleto
determine national incomes and national expenditure on each
industry's output; these in turn make it possible to make new10
estimates of the true price indices and wage rates, which can thefl
be used for a second round, and so on. Not coincidentally, this is
precisely the method used to calculate the numerical examples in
Part 3 of this paper. But we find it a useful way to organize the
discussion as well.
Let us begin, then, with the determination of the number of
differentiated products manufactured in each industry in each
country. We note that this is a Dixit-Stiglitz-type setup, with
constant elasticity of demand. In this type of model, the zero-
profit condition establishes a unique size of firm that is
independent of the size of the market:
0Aj.-(a—l)
(7)
This in turn implies that the number of differentiated products
manufactured in that industry is proportional to the composite
input of labor and intermediate goods:
fl1 Z/G (8)
But how much of that composite is supplied? At any point in
time the labor allocated to each industry is given, but the ratio
of intermediate input to labor depends on the ratio of the true
price index of th. input to the wage rate:11
1 1
suppressingsome constant terms, this implies that the number
of intermediate goods produced in each country can be determined
given labor input, w, and T:
n1=L(w2/T2) (10)
Nextwe turn to the determination ofincomein each country,
which is simply the sum of wages earned in each sector:
y— wL1w2(l-L1) (11.)
Whatmatters for industry location is not, however, aggregate
income but expenditure on that industry's products. This includes
expenditure for products used as intermediate inputs. Bearing in
mindthat a share M of the value of industry sales is spent on
intermediates, we may write the Home expenditure on industry i as
=O.5Y+ (12)
1-11
We may note that in (12) a large domestic industry --thatis,
a large L1 ——impliesa large domestic market for that industry's
products. This "backward linkage" is one of the twoforces that
work toward industry agglomeration.
The other force working toward agglomeration is the"forward
linkage" that works via the cost side. The marginalcost of
production depends on the wage rate and onthe price of12
intermediates; again suppressing some constant terms, we may write
MC = (13)
The true price of intermediates --whichis also the true
price of the corresponding aggregate consumption good --dependson
the prices of typical products and on the numbers of these products
available. A domestic good supplied to the domestic market has a
price that is proportional to the marginal cost MC; a domestic good
supplied to the foreign market is soirl at a price equal to the
domestic price multiplied by the transport cost r.Thuswe may
write the domestic price index for aggregate i as
a[nic'.n;(tMc;)L- (14)
Noticethat other things equal a large domestic industry, as
represented by a large n, tends to mean a lower price index. But
the price index enters into the cost of production, so this is a
"forward linkage" which, like th. backward linkage through demand,
tends to promote agglomeration.
Finally, we can determine thewage rate ineach sector in each
country. The value of thetotalsales of Home—based firms in






Ofthese total sales, a fraction 1— represents labor income;
this must equal the total labor income wL1earnedin that industry,13
implying the wage equation
.11 W 2 ()EI •
T (16)
L1 MC1 MC
Wenow have all of the ingredients for a solution of the
model for any given resource allocation. Equations (10), (11),
(12) ,(13),(14), and (16) -—togetherwith their counterpart
equations for Foreign -—forma simultaneous system that can be
solved for n, 1, E1, MC, T1, and w1 in both industries and in both
countries. Aridgiventhe wage rates, we are then able to describe
the dynamics.
This system of simultaneous equations is easy to solve
numerically given values of the parameters. Furthermore, its
properties can be fairly thoroughly explored numerically, since
there are only three parameters that cannot be eliminated by choice
of units: the transport cost r, the elasticity of substitution a,
and the share of intermediates in cost M. The system does not,
however, lend itself to any easy analytical solution. Taking into
account the existence of two countries (but subtracting one
equation after defining a numeraire), there are actually21
variables to be simultaneously determined, by equations that are
highly nonlinear in some cases. As we will see, it is possibleto
get some useful analytical information out ofthe system all the
same; but as a starting point, we turn nextto some numerical
exploration.14
3. Dynamic behavior
We begin our exploration of the model's dynamics with a
series of numerical examples. In all of these examples we set a=4
and s .5. These are not intended to be especially realistic
numbers; they imply a high degree of market power and very strong
backward and forward linkages, so that it takes very large
transport costs to prevent specialization. The reason for choosing
these parameters is simply to make prettier pictures. For more
realisticnumbers the qualitative results are the same, butcrucial
aspects of the figures are less visible.
Figure 1 illustrates the model's dynamics for the case of high
transport costs, r —4.On the axes are the employment in industry
1 in Home and Foreign, L1 and L. The arrows illustrate the
direction and speed of change, as determined by (6). (Each arrow is
determined by solving our general equilibrium model for the
resource allocation corresponding to the vector's origin; the
implied wage rates then determine the position of the head).
It is immediately apparent that in this high-transport-cost
case the allocation of resources always converges to a symmetric
outcome in which each industry is equally divided between. the two
countries. That is,, this figure illustrates a "European" outcome in
which the backward and forward linkages are not strong enough to
lead to agglomeration.
Figure 2 shows the contrary case, in which transport costs are
much lower, r—2.2.In this case, it is clear that the system is15
saddle—path unstable: except along a knife-edge path that leads to
a symmetric outcome, each industry will end up completely
concentrated in one country. That is, this figure illustrates the
"American" outcome in which highly localized industries serve the
whole continental market.2
Are these the only possible cases? No: for intermediate
values of r a more complex picture appears. Figure 3 shows the
dynamics when t =2.7.This figure shows not two but three "basins
of attraction." If the economy starts with a fairly equal division
of each industry between the two countries, it will converge to a
"European" outcome without agglomeration; but if the industries are
initially very unequally distributed, the concentrations are self-
reinforcing and we end up with complete specialization.
To understand the dynamics better, Figures 4 and 5 offer two
alternative ways of looking at this intermediate case. Figure 4 is
a more conventional phase diagram, showing the calculated loci
along which dL1Jdt —0and dL1/dt —0;arrows indicate the
directions of motion in each region. It is clear that there is a
locally stable equilibrium with equal division of the industries,
flanked along the main diagonal by two unstable equilibria. The
2For more realistic parameter values, Figure 2 tends to be
dominated by a movement toward the main diagonal, with very short
arrows pointing the way toward concentration. In effect, the model
tells us that market forces will quickly ensure that the industry
as a whole is the right size, but take their time about gettingit
in the right place. We suspect that this may represent the truth as
well as the way our model works, but for illustrative purposes we
choose to use parameters that exaggerate the tendency to
agglomeration.16
broken lines show schematically how the space is divided into the
central basin of attraction, i.e., initial conditions leading to
the central equilibrium, and the basins that lead to the corners.
Figure 5 calculates the basins of attraction directly, by
allowing the model to evolve for 100 time periods from a number of
starting points. If the outome approximates concentration in Home,
the starting point is represented by a square; if it approximates
concentration in Foreign, the starting point is represented by a
triangle; initial conditions that lead to approximately equal
shares get a diamond. (Points that meet none of the criteria get
circles) .
Thequalitative behavior of this economy, then, depends on the
level of transport cost. At high levels of transport cost there is
never agglomeration; there is a range of transport costs for which
agglomeration may but need not occur; and at sufficiently low
transport costs only agglomerated equilibri are stable. This
changing behavior can be illustrated by a bifurcation diagram like
Figure 6, which shows calculated equilibrium values of L as a
function of i.(Sincethe economy always ends up on on the main
diagonal, L 1 —L1in equilibrium, allowing us to represent
outcomes in terms of a single variable). In the figure, solid lines
represent stable equilibria, whil, broken lines represent unstable
equilibria. There ar. two critical levels of r: a "sufficient"
31t may be worth pointing out that whil, the story here is
quite intuitive, modern computing is rather helpful for
constructing examples. Figure 5 requires the solution of 81.00 CGE
models!17
level below which agglomeration g happen, and a lower "necessary"
level below which it st happen.
It is possible to derive some analytical results about the
"sufficient" level. Consider the case where each industry is
concentrated in one country, that is, where L1 —1and L =0.(The
reverse pattern of specialization is of course symmetric) .This
will be a locally stable outcome if U1> w2given that resource
allocation; in that case Home workers will have no incentive to
move out of industry 1, and the symmetrical Foreign workers will
have no incentive to move out of industry 2.
Computing wages for this corner solution is much easier than
in the general case, because many of the terms in the model drop
out. In particular, it is possible to show that
v(.'I* + (17)
w1) 2 2
Agglomeration is locally stable if V<l.
The right-hand side of (17) looks familiar: it is identical
to the criterion for agglomeration derived for the case of a
geographical model with factor mobility in Krugman (1991). The only
difference is in the interpretation of M. In Xrugman (1991)was
the share of manufactures in the economy as a whole, whereas here
it is the share of intermediate goods in production costs. In
either case, however, ,ideterminesthe importance of forward and13
backward linkages and thus of localized external economies.
Since the criterion for agglomeration is identical to that in
the earlier paper, the results carry over directly. Provided that
M <(a-1)/a-—ineffect, if linkages and scale economies are not
too strong --therelationship between r and V has the shape
illustrated in Figure 7. There is a critical level of r below which
V<l, and in which agglomeration is therefore self-sustaining.
It is shown in Krugman (1991) that this critical level of rin
turn depends on the levels of a and : agglomeration is more likely
to be sustainable ifis high and a is low. In the context of our
model, that means that agglomeration is likely if intermediates are
a large share of cost and if economies of scale at the level of the
firmarelarge.
It is much more difficult to derive analytical results for
the "necessary" level of r, that level below which agglomeration
must occur. Numerical examples suggest, however, that it is
affected by M and a in the same way.
We have now described the dynamics of industry agglomeration.
The next step is to consider the policy issues that this process
may pose.
4. The adiustment Droblem
Suppose that we take this model as a highly stylized
representation of the reasons for the striking difference between
the pattern of industry location between the US and Europe. That19
is, the geographic concentration of industry we consider to result
from the historically higher degree of economic integration. What
would we then expect to happen as Europe becomes a single market?
One possibility is that in spite of 1992, European markets
will remain substantially less integrated than those in the United
States. It is certainly arguable that differences in language and
culture will continue to segment markets, whatever the European
Commission may do. In that case, of course, nothing will happen.
A second possibility is that while European markets become as
integrated as those in North America, this increased integration is
not sufficient to destabilize the existing geography of production.
This case would correspond to the intermediate range of r in Figure
6, in which there are multiple structural equilibria: markets are
sufficiently well integrated so that agglomeration is possible but
not so integrated that it is necessary. If a continent has
developed highly geographically concentrated industries, they will
persist; but a polycentric geography is also sustainable.
The worrisome possibility, however, is that the increased
integration of European markets will, in fact, push the continental
economy into the rang. in which existing national industries
unravel, agglomerating into a smaller number of industrial
districts serving the continent as a whole.
Why is this a worrisome possibility? Because while the end
result will be to raise real incomes, there may well be serious
adjustment problems along the way.
Figure 8 shows how the real wages of Home workers in each20
industry vary as the allocation of labor is moved along the main
diagonal, that is, where L1 =lLL.In this figure, we assume r =
2,that is, integration has proceeded to the point where
agglomeration must take place. We may imagine that initially the
European economy is at a point where L=O.5, that is, with
industries equally divided among the two countries. Given the new,
higher degree of integration, however, this is no longer a stable
equilibrium, and Home will specialize over time in one or the other
industry.
Suppose that it specializes in industry 1. As it does so, the
real wages of workers in industry 1 will rise. And since in the
long run all Home workers will in fact be in industry 1, the long-
run effect of agglomeration is unambiguously beneficial. In the
short and medium run, however, some workers will remain in industry
2 ——andthey will suffer a decline in real wages as L1 rises. The
reason is that the shrinkage of their industry means a loss of
forward and backward linkages, coupled with increasingly effective
competition from the growing industry in Foreign.
The workers left behind in industry 2, then, will initially be
hurt by integration and specialization. In a more realistic model,
we might well imagine that in addition to a fall, in real wages they
will also experience a rise in unemployment, adding to the
painfulness of the adjustment.
The political difficulties posed by this adjustment problem
are obvious. European nations may be enthusiastic about the
benefits of economic integration in the abstract. But when it turns21
out that such integration involves losses as well as gains, and in
particularthat the geographic consolidation of industries means
that some national industries vanish, the charges of "social
dumping" are sure to fly.
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Table 1: Shares of industry em1ov-rnent
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